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Great Britain.

LONDON, SEPTEMBER 11—12, 1881.

THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

It is so long since the external tranquillity of Egyptian affairs has been broken, that many of the English public had almost, we imagine, begun to regard the existing régime in Egypt as invested with the stability of a long-settled Western Government. How erroneous this notion was we have more than once taken occasion to remind our readers; and the true condition of matters in that country has now been still more forcibly brought home to them by events. The real insecurity of the tenure whereby the essentially artificial system of government which England and France have imposed upon Egypt has hitherto maintained itself is strikingly illustrated by the incident of Friday last. The demonstration is seen in one of the reports as wholly "unexpected," but unless this merely means that there was no immediate expectation of it at the particular moment when it occurred, the statement is in direct contradiction of sufficiently well-known facts. For, as a matter of fact, the probable outbreak of a military *coup d'état* at Cairo has been a common topic of speculation in all quarters but those in which, as we have said, the maintenance of order in Egypt and the persistently smooth working of the delicate machinery of its Government have been incuriously assumed. Elsewhere it has long been an open secret that some such *coup* was in preparation, and its probability has, in fact, been recognised by expressed diplomatic action. Mr. Malet's mission to Constantinople was directed, it is believed, to the express object of bringing this probability to the notice of the Ottoman Government; and the telegrams of the last few days had brought word of an interchange of views between Lord Dufferin and the Porte on the question of Turkish military intervention for the purpose of suppressing any disorders of the kind. The *coup* of last Friday was so far from being unexpected in this sense that the proper mode of dealing with it was actually under consideration at the moment when it broke out. Suddenly, however, in its actual occurrence it undoubtedly was; and the suddenness with which the blow has been struck and its object attained, adds greatly to the difficulties of the situation. It would be vain, of course, to deny that this is not its only difficulty, so far as the English Government is concerned. Nothing would be gained by affecting to ignore the suspicion which the whole affair, and the intrigues supposed to have preceded it, so strongly suggest. That suspicion may be unfounded, but it undoubtedly exists; and it will depend upon the action taken by the French Government whether it is dissipated or confirmed. At present, however, we are compelled to take it provisionally into account, and at all events to suspend judgment for a time as to the possibility that the military *coup d'état* at Cairo may be viewed, if not with actual approval, at any rate without positive disfavour by France. This point, however, should be soon ascertained. An interchange of communications between the two partners in the Protectorate can hardly fail to bring the truth to light; although, so far as this particular incident is concerned, the knowledge will doubtless reach us too late to be turned to any practical use. From all accounts, it would appear that the Khedive's compromise with his malcontent officers was effected through the instrumentality of our representatives; and the English Government may, therefore, consider themselves precluded from making any demand, either alone or in concert with France, for the restoration of the dismissed Ministers. Nor possibly might it be deemed wise to do, even if it were permissible. It may be thought best to assent to the substitution of Cherif for Riaz Pacha, and thus far to apply the principle *fieri non debet, factum rite* to the irregular action of the Khedive's soldiery. But it is quite impossible to leave the Egyptian régime exposed to the risk of a similar attack in the future. The men who demand a change of Ministers to-day may demand a change of political system to-morrow; they may insist on the abolition of the financial control, and the dismissal of the European administrators; or they may clamour for the abrogation of the capitulations, and seek to sweep away the judicial tribunals which that international convention established. The mere possibility of such action is sufficient to show that the situation now created in Egypt is one which can on no account be tolerated. It is impossible for the Western Powers, and most emphatically for England, to permit the vast interests in the peace, order, and solvency of Egypt to remain at the mercy of a handful of military adventurers, whether with or without the backing, open or secret, of any other European State. None the less, however, must it be admitted that of all the possible methods of extricating Egypt from this position, there is none which is not surrounded with very grave objections. In order that future military demonstrations of this kind should be anticipated, or, on their occurrence, repressed, it would be necessary to occupy the country with a force strong enough either to overawe the Egyptian army, or to maintain order, if as would be far preferable, that army were to be largely reduced from its present unnecessary strength. And it is certainly no easy matter to say whence this occupying force is to come. Neither of the two partners in the Dual Protectorate will, and arrived at Robat on the 8th inst.; but no

readily consent to the occupation of Egypt by the troops of the other; and what neither France nor England would be permitted to do separately they have neither of them much inclination to attempt in common. Of ourselves, at any rate, it may be said that the prospect of a joint occupation of Egypt by the armies of the two Powers would be regarded in England with great disfavour upon more grounds than one. Nor does the suggestion that Turkey should despatch a contingent of its troops to maintain order in the Khedive's dominions appear much more promising. It would be pretty sure to encounter the strongest resistance from France, and reasons could be adduced by her for her opposition which the present English Government would find it exceedingly difficult to combat. Yet unless, as has been said, we are to give up Egypt to military domination, it would appear inevitable that one of these three courses should be adopted. To call upon the Khedive to disband or to reduce the army which has just shown itself to be his master, without proffering him any material assistance in the work, would be manifestly absurd; yet to leave the army in full possession of the powers which they have thus exercised would virtually amount to acquiescence in their claim to play, whenever it suits them, the part of a Praetorian Guard under the late Roman Empire, and to elevate their officers to the political importance of a popular Spanish General under Isabella II. The problem before the English Cabinet is undoubtedly a critical one; and though there may of course be still reason to hope that the French Government will simplify it by their co-operation, it is by no means possible to feel much confidence on that score. We have often pointed out the essentially temporary and provisional character of the dual Protectorate, and remarked upon the causes and chances which might at any moment tend to dissolve the unstable cohesive union between the two Powers. It may be that the hour of that dissolution is already approaching.—*Observer.*

The *Times* says:—The Egyptian army must be disbanded. Its continued existence is not compatible with the maintenance of civil order. But will the army and its leaders be brought to consent to their own extinction? Will the Khedive consent to part with his army, and, if so, will he be able to get rid of it? We must be prepared to act on all points. We may wait awhile, but with a policy in view which, if need be, will save Egypt from herself, and from the disorder with which she is more than threatened. Force, it is not unlikely, will have to be met by force. The question will be where the countering force is to be obtained. To the military occupation of Egypt by England and France jointly, or by either country separately, the objections are so grave as to be insuperable. Neither country would consent to abdicate in favour of the other. The thing, if it were done at all, would have to be done by them both together. But it has been no easy work to the two countries to act together in Egypt. Their joint armed intervention would be more difficult still. It is most improbable that our Government would attempt a movement so likely to lead to mischief and to misunderstandings worse by far than the evil it was intended to combat. There remains, then, but one course open. If intervention there must be, Turkey must be invited to deal with the emergency in Egypt. There are objections to this course, but the case is one in which we must make choice between evils and the interposition of Turkey at the request of the two Powers is the least evil of them all. That we should leave Turkey free to move an army into Egypt, and to keep it there during her pleasure, is not to be thought of. What would be asked of Turkey is to furnish the means for quelling—effectually the existing disorder in Egypt. The army is the source of the mischief, and the army, therefore, must be put down. If Turkey were to undertake the work, it is very possible that no resistance would be offered. The Egyptian army is not large. It consists of some thirteen or fourteen thousand soldiers at most. The whole of these united could do nothing against a detachment of Turkish troops, and it is most unlikely that they would be united. But the Egyptian army, large or small, is a very much larger force than Egypt has any need for. A few locally raised troops would sufficiently guard the southern frontier of the Khedive's dominions. For the internal order of the country a good police would be enough. An army on the present footing serves only as a needless expense and a temptation to further expense in needless wars. When it becomes also positively mischievous the case against it is complete, if, indeed, it were not complete before.

RETIREMENT OF MR. SULLIVAN, M.P.

Everyone will hear with regret of Mr. A. M. Sullivan's determination to resign his seat in Parliament; and the regret will naturally be much the greater because ill health has compelled the resolve:—

It is not an exaggeration to say that Mr. Sullivan had the respect of all parties in the House of Commons. He always held his own party, in so far as it represented the principles he had pledged himself to support, but he never took part in or countenanced extraneous parties, and he never spoke bitter words or ascribed ignoble motives to his political opponents. He was undoubtedly one of the most eloquent and ready debaters in the House of Commons, and more nearly approached perhaps to the rank of an orator than any other of his colleagues.

The week ago the Viceroy said to me "There is no longer any necessity for a change of Ministry." Yesterday four thousand troops surrounded the Abdin Palace and a Constitution, and an increase of the troops to 12,000, and eventually Mr. Cookson said to have had orders the troops the Khedive's decree naming Sherif Pacha as President of the Council. Haidar Pacha is to be Finance Minister, and Baroudi War Minister. There is only one opinion among the opponents and supporters of Riaz Pacha—that, however advisable his dismissal previously was, the demand of troops rendered it absolutely necessary to support him, unless the Khedive was prepared to abdicate and hand over all the powers of government to a proletarian. As regards Sherif Pacha, even his friends regret that he should have accepted office under such circumstances. His conduct before the Commission of Inquiry seemed to have rendered it impossible that he should hold office under a reformed Government; but this impression was becoming fainter. His consenting to be nominated by the troops shows either that he fails to understand the situation, or that he is an accomplice in the revolution. The only man who apparently possessed Nubar Pacha, who has died entirely alone, and who would probably consent to serve with Riaz if the latter will shun his pretensions and accept a subordinate position. Armed support might be necessary for the first few months, but firm measures would soon restore tranquillity. The Khedive, though fatally weak and vacillating, is

readily consent to the occupation of Egypt by the troops of the other; and what neither France nor England would be permitted to do separately they have neither of them much inclination to attempt in common. Of ourselves, at any rate, it may be said that the prospect of a joint occupation of Egypt by the armies of the two Powers would be regarded in England with great disfavour upon more grounds than one. Nor does the suggestion that Turkey should despatch a contingent of its troops to maintain order in the Khedive's dominions appear much more promising. It would be pretty sure to encounter the strongest resistance from France, and reasons could be adduced by her for her opposition which the present English Government would find it exceedingly difficult to combat. Yet unless, as has been said, we are to give up Egypt to military domination, it would appear inevitable that one of these three courses should be adopted. To call upon the Khedive to disband or to reduce the army which has just shown itself to be his master, without proffering him any material assistance in the work, would be manifestly absurd; yet to leave the army in full possession of the powers which they have thus exercised would virtually amount to acquiescence in their claim to play, whenever it suits them, the part of a Praetorian Guard under the late Roman Empire, and to elevate their officers to the political importance of a popular Spanish General under Isabella II. The problem before the English Cabinet is undoubtedly a critical one; and though there may of course be still reason to hope that the French Government will simplify it by their co-operation, it is by no means possible to feel much confidence on that score. We have often pointed out the essentially temporary and provisional character of the dual Protectorate, and remarked upon the causes and chances which might at any moment tend to dissolve the unstable cohesive union between the two Powers. It may be that the hour of that dissolution is already approaching.—*Observer.*

The officers are relying on support or neutrality from Constantinople. I believe the leaders are held but misguided, acting from a mistaken sense of duty and utterly ignorant of the consequences.

The correspondent of the same paper at Alexandria telegraphed on Saturday:—

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readily consent to the occupation of Egypt by the troops of the other; and what neither France nor England would be permitted to do separately they have neither of them much inclination to attempt in common. The conduct of Mr. Cookson is considered inexplicable. That he should have counseled the Khedive to temporarily submit to force when no other course was open, and until troops could arrive from Cairo, was, perhaps, necessary; but that he should have acted as the actual bearer to the insurgents of the Viceroy's surrender, and should have thereby seemed to give England's sanction to mob rule, is so improbable and so inconsistent with his usual caution that it is barely credible.

COURT AND FASHIONABLE NEWS.

BALMORAL, SATURDAY.

The Queen, accompanied by the Duchess of Connaught and the Duchess of Cambridge, walked out yesterday morning, and in the afternoon her Majesty walked and drove with the Duke and Duchess of Connaught. Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales, with the Princesses Louise, Victoria, and Maud, arrived at Abergeldie Castle yesterday, and in the afternoon visited her Majesty. The Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh and Prince Leopold walked out. Lord Carlingford had the honour of dining with Queen and Royal Family.

SUNDAY.

The Queen yesterday morning walked with Prince Leopold, and her Majesty in the afternoon drove through Castleton, round the Lion's Face with the Duchess of Edinburgh and the Duchess of Connaught. The Duke of Edinburgh and the Duke of Connaught went to a deer drive with the Prince of Wales at the Abergeldie woods. Lord Carlingford had the honour of dining with the Queen and the Royal Family, as well as the Rev. Dr. Donald Macleod, one of her Majesty's chaplains, who arrived at the Castle in the evening.

The Duke of Cambridge left Inverness on Saturday morning after having, accompanied by Colonel Warrant and Colonel Baillie, commanding the Northern District, paid a visit to the new barracks in course of erection there. The Duke arrived at Ballater Station at six in the evening, and proceeded to Aberfeldy Castle on a visit to the Prince and Princess of Wales.

Viscountess Clifden and Hon. Lilah Agar have been visiting the Duke and Duchess of Sutherland, for Taymouth Castle, on a visit to the Earl and Countess of Breadalbane.

Lord Carlingford, Lord Privy Seal, is expected to leave Balmoral, where his lordship has been acting as Minister in Attendance on the Queen, early in the week, for The Prince, Viscountess Clifden and Hon. Lilah Agar have been visiting the Duke and Duchess of Sutherland, for Taymouth Castle, on a visit to the Earl and Countess of Breadalbane.

Baroness Burdett-Coutts and Mr. Burdett-Coutts, after visiting Lord Houghton at Fyvie Hall, Yorkshire, arrived at the close of last week at Beaufort Castle, near Hexham, Northumberland, on a visit to Mrs. Abbot. During this week they are expected to leave for Scotland.

The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone left his official residence in Downing-street on Saturday afternoon for Hawarden Castle.

The death is announced of Lord Carew, who died after a short illness on Thursday evening at the family residence, 28 Grosvenor-square. His lordship was attending his Parliamentary duties in the House of Lords till the end of the session in apparently excellent health. His lordship supported the Government Irish Land Bill, and voted against the Duke of Argyl's amendment to Clause 1. Late Robert Shapland, first Lord Carew, Baron Carew of the county of Wexford, of Castle Row, county Wexford, in the peerage of the United Kingdom, was the eldest son of Robert Shapland, first Lord Carew, K. B., by Jane Catherine, daughter of the late Major Anthony Cliffe, of Bos, and was born January 28, 1818. He was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, and shortly after attaining his majority entered the House of Commons as member for county Waterford, having been returned at the general election in 1841, and in 1852 was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Wexford, and in 1872 was made a Knight of the Order of the British Throne. He died on July 16, 1881, Emily Anne, second daughter of Sir George Richard Phillips, Bart., and Hon. Sarah Cavendish, by whom he leaves issue two sons, the Hon. Robert Shapland George Julian Carew, who attained his majority in June last, and the Hon. George Patrick John Carew, born in February, 1863. The deceased nobleman was a constant resident on his estates in Ireland, where he was greatly esteemed not only as a wise and kind landlord, but as a large and liberal employer of labour.

The Khedive ordered him to dismount, while a sergeant told him to shave his sword. He did both, but Tewitler hesitated to adopt Mr. Colvin's advice, and, instead of asking for his sword, inquired his business. The reply was, "We come for law and justice; so long as you give us both you are our ready." Mr. Colvin then withdrew with the Khedive and undertook negotiations with the officers. He explained the folly and danger of their demands, and urged a withdrawal of the troops; for if the Viceroy were forced to accept their terms he would not be allowed to carry them out. The officers, however, remained obstinate. About 4.30 p.m. Mr. Cookson returned with the Austrian Consul and General Goldsmid. Mr. Cookson took the initiative, and used similar arguments, but without success. The officers, who were perfectly civil, stated that they had come for their three points, that the affair concerned them and not foreigners. Finally the Khedive accepted the dismissal of the Ministry under compulsion, leaving the other two points for reference to Constantinople. As regards the new Ministry, the officers attended to enforce conditions, and then left. The Khedive's free choice, but Haider and Lyoudi being preferred, they demanded both the names. The officers, named Sheriff; the Khedive said he would refuse orders. The colonels insisted that the declaration should be in writing. The Khedive signed a letter asking Sheriff to form a Ministry, which was handed to the troops. The troops then assaulted, and were leaving, when they returned and asked for the dismissal of the Prefect of Police, to which Mr. Colvin refused to listen. The colonels refused to become the nominees of mutineers, and has acted with perfect good faith. He is now acting with Mr. Colvin as mediator, on the basis of the resignation of the officers with the guarantee of a full amnesty, but success is very doubtful. The more moderate officers are already losing their influence. Though Oursar assured the Consuls that there was no danger to Europeans, even his power may prove ineffective.

THE DRAMA.

PRINCESS'S THEATRE.

The *Lights o' London*, a new play in five acts, written by Mr. G. R. Sims, was produced on Saturday night at the Princess's Theatre with unquestionable success. The author has evidently determined to render his play sensational and realistic, and although he may not have presented any new types of character, nor any strikingly original situations, he has made skillful use of materials more or less familiar to theatre-goers, and has constructed a play which is likely to prove a large success.

The hero of the piece is Harold Armitage (Mr. Wilson Barrett), who has alienated the affection of his father, the late Sir George Richard Phillips, Bart., and Harold